Effects of multiple gene control on the spread of altruism by group selection

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#### Abstract

The origin of altruistic behavior, i.e. the behavior that is useful for a population or a species but goes at the expense of an altruistic individual, has long been a challenge for students of evolutionary biology. The populations with altruistic individuals thrive better than those without altruists; however, the altruists within a population thrive worse than the non-altruists and their prevalence in the population decreases due to individual selection. Under certain conditions, the strength of group selection, i.e. the competition between populations, can surpass the strength of individual selection; however, such conditions are rarely achieved in practice. It was suggested recently that chances for altruistic behavior to spread highly increase when it is controlled not by a single gene but by multiple independent genes substitutable in their effects on the phenotype of the individual. Here we confirm the original verbal model published as part of the frozen plasticity theory by numerical modeling of the spread of altruistic/selfish alleles in a metapopulation consisting of partly isolated groups of organisms (demes) interconnected by migration. We have shown that altruistic behavior coded by multiple substitutable genes can stably coexist with selfish behavior, even under relatively high mutation and migration rates, i.e. under such conditions where altruistic behavior coded by a single gene is quickly outcompeted in a metapopulation.

### 1 Introduction

The problem of evolution and persistence of altruistic behavior has long been a challenge for theoretical and evolutionary biology. According to classical models, a behavioral pattern that provides an advantage to a group and at the same time places its carrier at a disadvantage has a low chance of spreading and enduring in nature. Groups in which the altruistic trait spreads would thrive better than those in which this trait is lacking and the average fitness of their members would be greater; however, selfish individuals who do not exhibit this trait and do not behave altruistically, but only enjoy the advantages provided

by the presence of altruists, would have the greatest fitness within these groups. It has been shown that under certain conditions, the strength of group selection can surpass that of individual selection, especially in populations with a certain structure and certain population dynamics [4]. However, most analyses have shown that under usual conditions, the spreading of an altruistic behavioral pattern is rather rare.

The chances for altruistic behavior to spread may considerably increase when complex gene interactions are responsible for the altruistic behavior. For example, the individuals behave altruistically when heterozygous in a particular altruistic gene while behaving selfishly when homozygous in such a gene or alternatively altruistic behavior is coded by multiple independent genes and the probability of altruistic behavior is a non-monotone function of the number of altruistic alleles in the genome (being the highest when this number approaches some intermediate value). It was, however, recently suggested that the probability of the origin and persistence of altruistic behavior was highly increased in any sexual species where any behavioral trait, including the altruistic behavior, is usually determined by a greater number of genes and many of these genes have (due to epistasis) a context-dependent influence on the particular trait. It was suggested that due to decreased heritability of traits, the probability of persistence of altruistic traits in a population is highly increased even for the altruistic behavioral patterns coded by several genes with additive or semiadditive effects [9].

In the present study, we tested a verbal model [9] based on the frozen plasticity theory [10] that suggests an increased probability of persistence of the altruistic behavioral patterns when coded by several substitutable genes rather than by a single gene with a large effect. The present study starts with the description of the model.

### 2 Model

We consider the *fitness* in the classical meaning of the word, i.e. if two individuals have the fitnesses equal to a and b, then the ratio of the expected number of their descendants is a/b. Especially, when the fitnesses of two individuals are 1 and 1 + c, we can say that the second individual has an *advantage* c over the first one. It is easy to see that if the fitnesses of two individuals are a and b and  $a \leq b$ , then the second individual has an advantage (b-a)/a over the first one.

Our model consists of a *metapopulation* of  $n \cdot m$  individuals. They are structured into n demes, of an average size of m. We monitor the metapopulation's behavior in N generations. Each generation consists of three phases: natural selection, migration and mutation.

The phase of natural selection results in the replacement of all the individuals by their descendants. Similarly as in [6, 7] this happens "at once" and the size of the metapopulation is preserved. Inside the metapopulation, two kinds of natural selection take place, intrademic and interdemic. Under intrademic selection, selfish individuals have an advantage  $\alpha$  over altruistic individuals, while under interdemic selection, altruistic demes have an advantage  $\beta$  over selfish demes. More formally, the meanings of  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  are as follows: The probability of a new individual becoming the member of the *i*-th deme is proportional to  $m_i + \beta a_i$ , where  $m_i$  is the size of the *i*-th deme and  $a_i$  is the number of altruists of the *i*-th deme. The parents of this new individual are two randomly chosen individuals from the *i*-th deme. The probability of a random individual becoming a parent is proportional to its fitness which is equal to 1 for an altruist individual and to  $1 + \alpha$  for a selfish individual. The phase of natural selection is ended by the extinction of any deme whose size is less than or equal to 2. Its place is taken by the deme of the largest size, which randomly splits in two new demes, with each individual being put randomly with a probability of 1/2 into the first or the second new deme.

Altruism is controlled by *gen* genes of each individual. Each of these genes is randomly inherited from individual's parents and each gene has two variants: an altruistic and a selfish one. The phenotype of the individual depends on whether or not the number of altruistic alleles in the genome is at least *thr* (threshold).

Mutations occur randomly and for all generations, all individuals and any of their genes the probability of an allele being switched from altruistic to selfish or vice-versa is  $\mu$ . The individuals can migrate between demes and the probability of an individual leaving its deme for another (randomly chosen) deme (i.e. migration rate) is  $\eta$ .

So far, the model has the following parameters: advantages of selfish individuals and altruistic demes  $(\alpha, \beta)$ , number of demes (n), average deme size (m), mutation rate  $(\mu)$ , migration rate  $(\eta)$ , altruism controlling mechanism (gen and thr), number of generations used for simulation (N) and the initial rate of altruists. By p let us denote the average rate of altruists during the whole evolution. We shall say that the *metapopulation is altruisic* if  $p \ge \varepsilon$ , where  $\varepsilon$  is the minimal rate of altruists needed for a metapopulation to be considered as altruistic. By R let us denote such an advantage of the altruistic demes, which leads to a 1/2probability of an altruistic metapopulation occurring. More formally, R is the advantage of the altruistic demes such that

$$\mathbb{P}(p \ge \varepsilon) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Naturally, R should be seen as a function of all the parameters from the model including  $\varepsilon$ . For practical usage, we shall always treat R as a function of just one parameter, other parameters will be fixed and their values will be clear from the context. Under weak selection we can assume that R, as a function of a selfish individuals advantage  $\alpha$ , is proportional to  $\alpha$  ( $R \sim \alpha$ ). Therefore, rather than R, we shall analyze the fraction  $r := R/\alpha$  for low values of  $\alpha$ , in our case  $\alpha = 0.01$ . This value was chosen as a compromise between a too big  $\alpha$  where  $R \sim \alpha$  holds no more and a too small  $\alpha$  where the effects of both intrademic and interdemic selection are too subtle comparing to random fluctuations of the system which enormously complicate the numerical analysis.

# 3 Simulation

The model described above was straightforwardly simulated by a program written in the C++ language. From N = 10000 generations we calculated the average rate of altruists p. If p is sufficient (i.e.  $p \ge \varepsilon$ ), we decrease a little the value of  $\beta$ , and vice versa. By repeating this procedure, we get  $\beta$  oscillating around the searched value R. Sadly, these oscillations and also the oscillations of averaged values of  $\beta$  are too big for calculating R with sufficient accuracy. Therefore, we use another approach: Instead of averaging the values of  $\beta$ , we attempt to find a linear model that would "explain" the measured values of  $\beta$ with some likelihood. We search the space of all possible models for the *best* model - such model that best explains the measured values. This approach is well known as the maximum likelihood method and is described in detail, for example, in [11]. The final value of R is then deduced from the best model.

# 4 Comparison of the model's behavior with the known theoretical results

The known theoretical results obtained by analytical computation generally refer to a weak selection (even if it is not stated explicitly by some authors, their assumptions only apply to weak selections). Therefore, they describe function r where gen = 1 and thr = 1.

Our first finding is that r does not depend on the initial rate of altruists. It clearly follows from the facts that there is enough time for alleles to mutate in both ways, and since both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are low, there is also enough time for altruism to spread as a result of the genetic drift. Further results are summarized in Figure 1. In accordance with [1, 2, 5] we get linear dependency of r on  $\eta$  and in accordance with [1, 5] we also get linear dependency of r on  $\mu$ . In discordance with [1, 5] the slope of the dependencies (i.e.  $\frac{\partial R}{\partial \eta}$ ) changes with different parameters n, m. The slope change is roughly in agreement with [2], although there is an inaccuracy of about 30% in its actual quantity. Furthermore, the dependencies of r on n and  $\mu$  are neglected in [2].

The disagreements mentioned above are a consequence of too strong assumptions taken by some authors in deriving their results. As an example, the stochasticity of the system is neglected [2], only demes containing either only altruistic or only selfish individuals are reproduced [1] or there is a neglect of strong correlations between dependent random variables [8]. We do not want to belittle any of the papers cited. Quite the opposite, our point is to illustrate that solving this problem analytically is very hard and resists numerous different approaches, no matter how inventive they are in using a wide range of mathematical tools.



Figure 1: Values of r as a dependence on migration rate  $\eta$ . Values of other parameters: number of demes n = 10, average deme size m = 10,  $\varepsilon = 1/2$ . Mutation rate:  $\mu = 0.001$  (empty circles)  $\mu = 0.007$  (full circles),  $\mu = 0.013$ (empty triangles)  $\mu = 0.019$  (full triangles). Dashed lines show results for the same values of  $\mu$  but for a different structure of the metapopulation: n = 5, m =20. The markings are approximately the size of the 90% confidence intervals calculated by the maximum likelihood method.

### 5 Weak selection and multiple gene control

By the weak selection we mean a regime where the fitness of all individuals is close to one. On the other hand, the strong selection means that the fitness can significantly vary between individuals. Naturally, these terms are not strictly defined and there is a continuous scale between the weak and strong selection.

The results from the simulation for some combinations of the parameters are presented in Tables 1 and 2. All r values in Table 1 are very close to each other. It is not accidental as we explain below.

Let us assume a metapopulation with the same rate p of the altruistic alleles in each deme and on each gene. The rate of the altruists (f) is then function of *thr*, *gen* and p. Especially for thr = 1, it can be calculated as follows:

$$f := 1 - (1 - p)^{gen} \tag{1}$$

(this is the case for models 1,2,3,5,6 and 7). For odd gen and  $thr = \lceil gen/2 \rceil$ , the frequency of the altruists f equals p (the case for models 4,8). We can say that allele of gene g is active if its change (from altruistic to selfish or vice versa) changes the phenotype of the individual. It clearly happens if (and only if) there are exactly thr - 1 altruistic alleles among the rest of the genes. Probability of such event will be denoted as P = P(p, gen, thr). Let us estimate the advantage that is conferred by a selfish/altruistic allele to the individual/deme, respectively. With a probability 1 - P, this allele does not influence anything and therefore, does not confer any advantage to anyone. With a probability P, the allele confers advantage  $\alpha$  to the individual (if the allele is selfish) or advantage  $\beta$  to the deme (if the allele is altruistic). We can regard the average advantages of the allele as the product of the probability of the allele being active multiplied by the advantage conferred to the individual/deme. We conclude that the selfish allele confers average advantage of  $P \cdot \alpha$  to the individual and altruistic allele confers advantage  $P \cdot \beta$  to the deme it inhabits. As the assumption about the equal distribution of the altruistic alleles holds, we can analyze the evolution of the gene g alleles independently on the evolution of other alleles of other genes. Let us now compare models 1 and 3. In model 1, we found a ratio  $r_1 = \beta/\alpha$  which leads to a rate of altruists (and therefore as well to a rate of altruistic alleles) 50%. If the same values  $\alpha, \beta$  are used in model 3, then the ratio of the actual advantages the allele confers in this model is:

$$r_3 = \frac{P \cdot \beta}{P \cdot \alpha} = \frac{\beta}{\alpha} = r_1.$$

Since we are in the regime of low values  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , we only expect the ratio of  $\alpha$  to  $\beta$  (and not the absolute values of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ) to be important for the rate of the altruistic alleles. This ratio does not change  $(r_1 = r_3)$  and therefore as in model 1, we also expect 50% of altruistic alleles on average also in model 3. By using equation 1, we get the final rate of altruists 31/32, which is exactly the value of  $\varepsilon$  in model 3. Using a similar approach, we can justify the similarity of all other results in Table 1. In Table 2, we work with lower values of  $\eta$ . This causes that the altruistic alleles cease to be evenly distributed and start grouping in some demes that will become more altruistic. It means that the results derived in Table 1 also cease to hold.

Summary: Under weak selection and strong migration (10% in our models), multiple gene control does not significantly affect the  $\beta/\alpha$  ratio needed for altruistic alleles to occur. On the other hand, multiple gene control does significantly affect the final rate of altruists (Table 1).

Under weak selection and not so strong migration, multiple gene control also helps to spread altruism by changing the  $\beta/\alpha$  ratio (Table 2). Although we are not able to explain such an outcome sufficiently, the next paragraph provides at least a partial explanation of this phenomenon.

Let us compare Model 5 and Model 7 from Table 2. Let us start with Model 5 and assume a purely altruistic metapopulation where one selfish migrant emerges in one of the demes. It spreads in the deme which consequently shrinks and finally vanishes. Until the extinction it spreads selfish migrants and potentially infect other demes by selfishness. It may happen that the selfish migrant or its descendants will not reproduce although they have advantage  $\alpha$  over the rest of the deme. It would change if altruism was controlled by five genes as it is in Model 7. Since thr = 1, even the descendants of a selfish migrant are with high probability altruists. Although the selfish migrant brings some selfish alleles to the new deme, their spreading is influenced mostly by random drift and they do not gain significant advantage from the selfish behavior.

Table 1: Models' parameters:  $n = 20, m = 30, \mu = 0.001, \eta = 0.1$ 

Model 1	$gen = 1, thr = 1, \varepsilon = 1/2$	$r = 5.2 \pm 0.1$
Model 2	$gen = 3, thr = 1, \varepsilon = 7/8$	$r = 5.6 \pm 0.1$
Model 3	$gen = 5, thr = 1, \epsilon = 31/32$	$r = 5.7 \pm 0.3$
Model 4	$gen = 5, thr = 3, \varepsilon = 1/2$	$r = 5.7 \pm 0.1$

Table 2: Models' parameters:  $n = 20, m = 20, \mu = 0.0005, \eta = 0.01$ 

Model 5	$gen = 1, thr = 1, \varepsilon = 1/2$	$r=0.50\pm0.03$
Model 6	$gen = 3, thr = 1, \varepsilon = 7/8$	$r = 0.43 \pm 0.03$
Model 7	$gen = 5, thr = 1, \epsilon = 31/32$	$r = 0.24 \pm 0.03$
Model 8	$gen = 5, thr = 3, \varepsilon = 1/2$	$r = 0.47 \pm 0.03$

### 6 Strong selection and multiple gene control

In [3] authors showed that under sufficiently low migration and mutation rates, the metapopulation can exist in two different semi-stable states. They are called S state, with almost all individuals being selfish, and A state, with almost all individuals being altruistic. Transitions between these two states are denoted as A-S and S-A.

The results of our simulation are in full accordance with existence of S and A states described in [3]. Although the authors of [3] used extremely low values of  $\mu$  and  $\eta$ , we observed the S and A states also when higher values of  $\mu$  and  $\eta$  together with higher advantages  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  were set. Note that naturally there is a strong correlation between existence of S and A states and the fact that R depends on the initial frequency of altruists.

In our simulations, we focus on A-S transition, i.e. we initialize all alleles in the metapopulation as altruistic. A similar shape of R as a function of  $\beta$ is observed for S-A transitions, but higher values of  $\beta$  are necessary for S-A transitions.

We will start with a brief explanation of the behavior of R as a function of  $\alpha$  under one-gene control of altruism. For small  $\alpha$  function R is similar to linear dependence, but for bigger  $\alpha$ , this no longer holds, and the function gets concavely or convexly shaped. Finally the R tends to asymptote either in horizontal or vertical direction. The horizontal asymptote is shown in Figure 2 on the left. It means that a relatively small advantage for altruists is sufficient for compensating for a much bigger advantage of selfish individuals. The vertical asymptote is shown in Figure 2 on the right. The interpretation is that a particular advantage of selfish individuals cannot be outweighed by any advantage of altruists, no matter how high.

We briefly describe the mechanism how different asymptotes occur. Let us



Figure 2: Values of R as a function of  $\alpha$ . The horizontal asymptote can be observed on the left, the vertical asymptote on the right. Parameters of the model: The number of demes n = 10, average deme size m = 10 (left) or m = 30 (right), mutation rate  $\mu = 0.001$ , migration rate  $\eta = 0.01$ .

suppose  $\alpha \to \infty$ , a relatively small  $\beta$  and a purely altruistic metapopulation where one selfish mutant emerges. This mutant spreads over its deme very quickly. The deme starts shrinking and finally goes extinct. If it succeeds in producing enough selfish migrants that spread, the selfishness will thrive. A similar effect occurs when  $\beta \to \infty$  and  $\alpha$  is relatively small. This time the selfish mutant spreads slowly in its own deme that is also shrinking proportionately slowly because of a lower number of altruists in it. Once there are no altruists in the deme, it almost immediately goes extinct. Once again, the main factor that influences the spread of the selfishness is the number of selfish migrants that are produced by the infected deme until it goes extinct. The number of selfish individuals is significantly influenced by the quantity  $m \cdot \beta$  which says how many migrants are produced in one generation by an average sized deme. It is also influenced by values  $\beta$  (for horizontal asymptotes) and  $\alpha$  (for vertical asymptotes), since these values predict how fast the deme will be shrinking. Contrary to this, no matter how big the values  $\alpha$  (for horizontal asymptotes) or  $\beta$  (for vertical asymptotes) are, a selfish individual cannot spread over its deme faster than in one generation and also a deme consisting of only selfish individuals needs at least one generation to extinct. Therefore, it does not matter how high these quantities are, once they are high enough, their change does not influence the number of selfish migrants. The asymptotic behavior is therefore a natural consequence of the systems being insensitive to a change of some parameters.

Let us now introduce the results for multiple gene control. We put gen = 5 and thr = 3. Let us remind that under the weak selection, there was no difference between gen = 5, thr = 3 and gen = 1, thr = 1. Differences now occur as an effect of strong selection and existence of semi-stable S and A states. Values of R, as a function of  $\alpha$ , are presented in Figure 3. The figure on the left demonstrates that under five-gene control, the observed values of R are significantly lower than under one-gene control. Also, the placement of



Figure 3: Values of R as a function of  $\alpha$ . Left: average deme size m = 55. Vertical asymptote also occurs for gen = 1, thr = 1 and for gen = 5, thr = 3. Right: average deme size m = 30, vertical asymptote for gen = 1, thr = 1 (empty circles), but horizontal asymptote for gen = 5, thr = 3 (full circles). The other parameters are equal to those given in Figure 2:  $n = 20, \eta = 0.01, \mu = 0.001$ 

the vertical asymptote is different. For one-gene control, its x coordinate is almost three times as high as that for five-gene control. It means that under five-gene control altruism can occur, even for such  $\alpha$  that makes it completely impossible under one-gene control. If we reduce the average deme size to m = 30, an interesting phenomenon occurs: for one-gene control, we still have vertical asymptote, while for five-gene control, we obtain horizontal asymptote. It is possible due to the fact that  $m \cdot \eta = 0.3$  which is roughly close to one.

We conclude, that under five-gene control, metapopulation can be altruistic even for such low values of  $\beta$  that would lead to complete annihilation of altruism under one-gene control.

# 7 Discussion

Although quite unfavorable conditions were chosen for altruism to spread (unlike others we used higher mutation and migration rates), the advantages of altruistic demes needed for altruism to spread are rather low. Even for onegene control, these values are lower than predicted by other theoretical studies. This is specific for the discussed model where altruistic demes thrive and produce other altruistic demes while selfish demes shrink and therefore produce fewer migrants. When intrademic selfishness only results in higher probability of deme extinction (but until extinction the size of the deme is constant, as is the case for example in [1], which presents a model that appears to be less realistic than ours), the values of R are significantly higher.

The model for multiple gene control of altruism used in this work is absolutely symmetric - an altruistic allele has exactly the same phenotype effects as any other altruistic allele present in the genome. In the reality, the situation will be different, with the phenotype effects of two altruistic alleles on two different genes varying from one another. Preliminary results of simulations of this scenario indicate that even this way of controlling altruism is quite efficient for spreading it.

Another important property of this model is that having one more altruistic allele always makes the individual at least as altruistic as it was before. If some negative dependencies were considered (i.e. having one more "altruistic" allele could result in a more selfish individual), then the spreading of altruism would be much easier. The important message of this paper is that, in agreement with the prediction of the former verbal model [9] based on the frozen plasticity theory [10], even quite trivial dependencies among altruistic alleles may have a strong impact on the spreading of altruism.

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