Frozen Evolution. Or, that’s not the way it is, Mr. Darwin. A Farewell to Selfish Gene.

Usefulnessis frequently confused with goal-orientation.However, in actual fact, there is a very substantial difference between these two concepts, which can be clearly illustrated on the following example. Attempts can be made to treat a sore throat using antibiotics or a incantation. In both cases, this will be goal-oriented behaviour, subservient to a particular purpose, targeted towards a particular goal. However, in only the first case will this also be useful conduct, i.e. in most cases it will objectively assist in achieving the given goal.

Goal-orientation, direction towards achieving a certain goal, a certain state, is designated by the term teleology.At certain times and in various circles, the concept of teleology was understood in different ways. At the most general level, it can be stated that teleology expresses a certain way of anchoring things and processes in the order of the world. The methodology of contemporary science clearly differentiates two types of archoring. A thing or a process can be anchored in that we describe its cause or in that we describe its purpose.There exists an important asymmetry between the two types of anchoring. Every phenomenon (process) has its cause, the logically essential or random phenomenon that caused it. However, only some phenomena have a purpose.

In the language of the systems theory, it can be stated that the properties of a system follow both from the properties of the parts (subsystems and elements) from which the particular system is composed, and also from the properties of the systems of which it is, itself, a subsystem. When we ask why a system has certain properties, for example, why a mullen (Verbascum spp.) flower is yellow, we are asking in one sentence about two completely different things. To begin with, at the particular moment, we could be interested in the cause of the yellow colour of the mullen flower. If we are biochemists, we will probably be asking about the mechanism that leads to the synthesis of the yellow pigment in the petals of the plant. If we are physicists, we will be interested in the mechanism leading to the absorbance or reflectance of light of certain wavelengths by the molecules of the relevant plant colourants. In both cases, we will be attempting to find an explanation (anchoring) of the particular phenomenon from below, internally, i.e. we are attempting to explain the properties of the system on the basis of the properties of the elements or subsystems from which it is composed.

However, similar questions can be resolved in the opposite way. In this case, we are looking for an explanation of certain properties of a system in the properties of the system (supersystem?) of which the studied system is a subsystem. Thus, if we are ecologists, we will be interested to learn, in connection with the yellow colour of the mullen flower, which pollinators the mullen needs to attract and which colour these pollinators prefer.

The teleological principle, at least as it is mostly understood today (anchoring in purpose) is thus actually an expression of a certain more general principle, based on the fact that a certain property of the system can, in some cases, be determined by the properties of the system of which it is, itself, a subsystem. There is currently no suitable term for this more general principle; however, here it will be, at least for working purposes, termed the principle of anchoring from above.

The concept of usefulness in biological systems is connected, not with the existence of goal-orientation, but rather with the existence of the mentioned principle of anchoring from above. This statement can again best be illustrated on a specific case.

If a large number of round stones of the same size are found in a particular place and if we ask why all these stones have the same size and shape, we can, according to the circumstances, basically receive two completely different answers. The common shape of the stones could depend on the mechanism of their formation, on the properties of the particular kind of rock and the type of forces to which they were exposed during their formation.  An alternative explanation could be that the identical shape and size of the stones are quite accidental, as far as the mechanisms of their formation are concerned, that each stone could have been formed quite differently. However, after their formation, all the stones were exposed to the same transport processes, rolling down hills or settling in river streams, so that stones of the same size and shape collected at a particular place. In this case, the identical shapes of the stones do not have a common cause in their formation, and are thus not anchored from below. However, there is no teleological explanation for it, as there is not goal-orientation. The proper explanation for this phenomenon lies in reference to its anchored from above, i.e. in reference to the fact that the stones are part of a supersystem (hill, river, gravitation) and the properties of this supersystem determine which kinds of stones will collect at certain places.

Contemporary science is frequently accused of excessive reductionism.Various authors mean different things by the term reductionism. One of these is just this tendency to explain the properties of systems entirely in terms of the properties of its elements or subsystems. This objection is, to a certain degree, justified, as a similar approach to the study of the properties of living and non-living nature is very widespread. However, it is incorrect and unfair to generalize. Contemporary science knows and uses both approaches, the approach from below, from the properties of elements to the properties of the system, and the approach from above, from the properties of the system to the properties of the elements from which it is composed.

In some fields, the latter approach has long been a matter of fact. This is true of biology, where it is usually apparent at first glance that many of the properties of organisms are determined by the character of the evolutionary processes in which organisms participate. However, a similar approach is beginning to be employed in other fields, including physics and cosmology. The anthropic principle (Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1996)is frequently employed in explaining some of the properties of the universe. In a simplified manner, it can be stated that, according to the anthropic principle or, to be more exact, the weak anthropic principle, our universe has just those properties, just that completely unique combination of values of the physical constants, that enable the creation of the common forms of matter, and thus for the formation of the galaxies of stars and planetary systems. The values of these constants could be completely different and, in fact, this could be far more probable. However, it is important that, in any universe in which there is an observer who is interested in the values of physical constants, an intelligent being – the product of biological evolution, the values of these constants must be approximately the same as in our universe – otherwise an observer could not exist in it.

In order for it to be possible to differentiate the usefulness of a system enforced from outside through the intentional will of intelligent beings, from internal usefulness, formed spontaneously as a consequence of the properties of the developing system itself, for example, usefulness formed as a consequence of biological evolution, some authors have proposed the term teleonomy (cf. astrology, astronomy) for the second type of usefulness. This term has not caught on yet. If, in addition, we realize that the usefulness of organisms is not connected with goal-orientation, we find that the term teleonomy is not really required in biology. Most philosophical discussions of purpose in biological systems are, in fact, actually concerned with goal-orientation; however, most discussions of purpose in the framework of evolutionary biology are really concerned with usefulness.